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Sense of agency refers to the sense of authorship of an action and its outcome. Sense
of agency is often explained through computational models of motor control (e.g., the
comparator model). Previous studies using the comparator model havemanipulated action-
outcome contingency to understand its effect on the sense of agency. More recent studies
have shown that cues related to outcome, priming outcome and priming action have an
effect on agency attribution. However, relatively few studies have focused on the effect of
recalibrating internal predictions on the sense of agency.This study aims to investigate how
feedback about action can recalibrate prediction and modulates the sense of agency.While
participants performed a Flanker task, we manipulated the feedback about the validity
of the action performed, independent of their responses. When true feedback is given,
the sense of agency would reﬂect congruency between the sensory outcome and the
action performed. The results show an opposite effect on the sense of agency when false
feedback was given.We propose that feedback about action performed can recalibrate the
prediction of sensory outcome and thus alter the sense of agency.
Keywords: sense of agency, motor control, forward model, error monitoring mechanisms, Flanker task, error
feedback, action intention
INTRODUCTION
Our ability to interact with the environment through action is an
essential aspect of our day-to day-life. Intention to act, prepara-
tion to move, generating motor commands, and sensory feedback
are some of the underlying aspects of sensorimotor experience
and sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002). Sense of agency is the
experience of authorship of an action (Gallagher, 2000). Multiple
theories have been proposed to describe mechanisms responsible
for the sense of agency (see David et al., 2008 for a review). Pre-
vious studies have manipulated action-outcome contingency to
understand its effect on the sense of agency. More recent stud-
ies have shown that cues related to outcome, priming outcome,
and priming action have an effect on agency attribution (Aarts
et al., 2005, 2009; Aarts, 2007, Dijksterhuis et al., 2008; van der
Weiden et al., 2010; Wenke et al., 2010). However, relatively few
studies have focused on the effect of modulating action per se on
self-action perception (Synofzik et al., 2006). The current study
investigates whether feedback about the action performed could
modulate the sense of agency. We hypothesize that manipulat-
ing feedback would alter agency attribution by recalibrating the
prediction of sensory outcome.
The sense of agency for intended action has been successfully
explained by the comparator model (Frith, 1992), which consists
of the inverse and forward models. The inverse model identi-
ﬁes motor commands to achieve a desired goal state and the
forward model predicts sensory consequences of motor actions.
These models are represented within the motor-control system
(Wolpert et al., 1998). The forward model is principally responsi-
ble for sense of agency because it generates an efference copy of
motor commands of intended action (Frith, 1992) and predicts
the corresponding sensory consequences. The predicted sensory
consequence is matched against the subsequent actual sensory
information (i.e., outcome). Sense of agency will be experienced
for those events for which the predicted and the sensed informa-
tion match. In case of a mismatch, the sense of agency will be
absent or could be attributed to an external agent.
In case of unintended actions (such as errors), there would be a
mismatch between the predicted outcome of the intended action
and the sensory outcome generated by the action performed. In
this case, the comparator model would infer an absence of self-
agency. However, Sato and Yasuda (2005) showed that sense of
agency depends on the congruency of an action and its outcome
not only when the action was intended, but also when it was
unintended.
One of the explanations for sense of agency in case of unin-
tended actions comes from studies on error monitoring mech-
anisms (van Schie et al., 2004; Yordanova et al., 2004; Knoblich
and Sebanz, 2005). These studies suggest that error-monitoring
signal detects conﬂict between several possible actions, which in
turn can be used to readjust the prediction of the sensory out-
come (i.e., conﬂict between the action performed and the sensory
outcome). Knoblich and Sebanz (2005) suggested that, this read-
justment could either serve as a direct indication of agency or it
could inﬂuence post-hoc judgment of agency. These suggestions,
although theoretically important, have not been formally tested.
Therefore, in the present study, we attempt to test how feedback
about the validity of action would modulate the sense of agency.
In this study, participants performed a Flanker task (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974) and generated a tone outcome similar to Sato
and Yasuda (2005). The tone generated was either congruent or
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Table 1 | Hypothesized sense of agency as a function of feedback
validity and tone congruency with the action performed.
Congruent tone Incongruent tone
True feedback High self-agency Low self-agency
False feedback Low self-agency High self-agency
incongruent with the action performed, an association that was
learnt during a training phase (seeMaterials andMethods). Before
the occurrence of the outcome, feedback about the validity of the
action performed was provided. That is, the feedback could either
be true or false, unbeknownst to the participants.When true feed-
back is given, participants should have higher sense of agency for
congruent tones, but low sense of agency for incongruent tones.
We hypothesize that a false feedback would reverse the judgment
about sense of agency (Table 1). Thus, when a false feedback
is given, participants might perceive a discrepancy between per-
formed and intended action. This would lead to a readjustment
of the prediction of sensory outcome (tone) based on an alternate
action, instead of the actual action performed. Therefore, validity
of feedback about the action performed would determine upcom-
ing sensory consequences and the agent would attribute agency
accordingly.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifteen undergraduate students (Mean age = 19.4 years, 13
males and two females, range: 19–28 years) participated in the
study. We repeated the experiment with 15 participants (Mean
age = 22.5 years, 10 male and ﬁve female, range: 20–26 years). All
the participants were right-handed with normal or corrected to
normal vision. They gave informed consent and were paid for the
participation.
STIMULI
Stimuli consist of two target letters “H” & “N.” In an initial train-
ing phase, the target letters were assigned two corresponding key
presses (left/right arrow key). The key presses were, in turn, asso-
ciated with two tones of 600 and 1000 Hz as sensory outcomes,
(Figure 1A). In the test phase (Figure 1B), we used the Eriksen
Flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) in which the target letter
was ﬂanked by two distracter letters on each side. The ﬂankers
could be either congruent (e.g., HHHHH) or incongruent (e.g.,
NNHNN) with the target letter. The sensory outcomes in the
test phase (i.e., Flanker task) were of the same tones as those
of the training phase. An action of pressing a button (left/right
arrow key) was required for each target presentation, prior to
the sensory outcome. Feedback was introduced for the action
made in response to the target letter in the Flanker task prior
to the sensory outcome (i.e., tone). A green tick mark () or
a red cross mark (χ) was used to indicate feedback, which was
manipulated independently from the actual response (see Proce-
dure). The assignment of target stimuli to action buttons, and to
the tone outcome was consistent throughout the experiment (i.e.,
training and test phase) for each participant and counterbalanced
across participants. The toneswere identical induration and sound
pressure throughout the experiment.
PROCEDURE
The participants entered a dimly lit room and were seated in front
of a computer screen with a pair of headphones (Sony MDR-
ZX700, Over-the-ear). They were provided a printed instruction
sheet that explained the task procedure. To induce the setting of
the study pertaining to sense of agency, the instruction sheet men-
tioned that another participant sitting in an adjacent room could
also generate the outcome. The experiment consisted of a training
phase and a test phase. In the training phase, the target letters (Hor
N) did not have any ﬂankers. The Participants learnt the associ-
ation between a key press (right or left arrow key, in response
to target letters) and a corresponding sensory outcome (600 or
1000 Hz tone). In the test phase, participants responded to the
same target letters in a Flanker task. A Feedback was introduced
whether response was correct or not, followed by sensory outcome
(600 Hz or 1000 Hz tone). A Self-report measure of the sense of
agency pertaining to the tone outcome was obtained. We manip-
ulated two within-subject factors – (a) type of sensory outcome
(congruent tone or incongruent tone) with the key press, and (b)
validity of feedback (true feedback or false feedback) for key press.
Participants completed a brief practice session (30 trials) before
the training and the test phases, to familiarize themselves with the
task procedures.
In the training phase (See Figure 1A), the participants per-
formed 300 trials. On each trial, 1000 ms after ﬁxation onset, the
target stimulus (i.e., “H” or “N”) was presented for 250 ms on the
center of the screen. The participants were required to press left or
right arrow keys, assigned to target letters ‘H’ and ‘N’, respectively.
The responses were made using the index and the ring ﬁngers of
the dominant hand. To reduce any possible memory effects, key
assignment was displayed on the screen. The participants were
instructed to press the assigned key upon the appearance of a tar-
get letter. Further, the action performed (key press) would evoke a
certain tone (600 Hz tone or a 1000 Hz). The tone was presented
immediately after the key press for 200ms. Incorrect trials resulted
in same tone outcome that was contingent on a key press and were
excluded from data analysis.
In the test phase (See Figure 1B) the participants performed
a Flanker task for 200 trials. Each trial started with the onset of
a centrally presented ﬁxation sign. After 1000 ms, a ﬁve-letter
array (i.e., HHHHH, NNNNN, HHNHH, or NNHNN) was pre-
sented for 250 ms. Participants were instructed to respond to one
of the two target letters (central H or N) with their right index or
ring ﬁngers, respectively. An immediate feedback was provided for
200 ms, which could be a true (green tick for correct response or
red cross for wrong response, 60% of total trials) or a false feed-
back (red cross for a correct response or green tick for a wrong
response, 40% of total trials). After 200 ms of offset of feedback,
a tone was presented through the headphones for 200 ms either
congruent or incongruent with the intended key-press. The par-
ticipants were then asked to rate their sense of self-agency (“I was
the one who produced the tone”). The responses could be “Yes”,
“No,” or “Maybe”. The left, right, and down arrow keys on the key-
board were used to record these responses using index, ring, and
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FIGURE 1 | Trial structure of (A) training phase and (B) test
phase. In training phase, participants learned the association
between action (key press towards target letter) and outcome
(tone). In test phase, target letter was ﬂanked by either congruent
or incongruent letters. We manipulated the feedback about the
validity of action performed, and tone congruency with intended
action. The participants reported self-agency ratings in the form of
“Yes”, “No”, or “Maybe.”
middle ﬁngers of the right hand, respectively. To prevent demand
effects and any other possible bias in responses, such as motor
preparation, the key assigned for “Yes” and “No” was randomized
between the left and right arrow keys across trials. The “Down”
arrow key was consistently assigned for “Maybe.” Our measure of
sense-of-agency was based on self-report. To minimize the inﬂu-
ence of experimental demand, an additional question on sense of
ownershipwas included.While the sense of agencywould bemod-
ulated by experimental conditions, the sense of ownership would
remain high in all experimental conditions, serving as a control
measure (Sato andYasuda, 2005). After every 10 trials, participants
rated the sense of agency (“I was the one who produced the tone”)
and the sense of ownership (“I was the one who was listening to
the tone”) by moving a slider bar with a mouse on a continuous
scale of 0–100 (see Figure 1B). The Presentation of both the ques-
tions was counterbalanced across the trials. The experiment was
designed and presented using Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard,
1997) in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.).
In this experiment (hereafter Experiment 1) we assumed that
participants believed in the feedback. We did not do an explicit
debrieﬁng after the experiment to avoid any information exchange
among the participants. To verify our assumption, we repeated the
experiment (hereafter Experiment 2) with a debrieﬁng session at
the end. The Participants were asked to report the percentage of
correct responses they had made out of total trials. They were also
asked to rate their belief in the accuracy of feedback on a scale of
0 (Disagree) to 10 (Agree).
DATA ANALYSIS
In the training phase, we measured the reaction time and accu-
racy of responses. In the test phase, we measured the reaction
time and accuracy towards the central target letter of the Flanker
stimuli. For each trial, we recorded self-report ratings of the sense
of agency (“Yes”, “No,” or “Maybe”) that were transformed into
discrete numerical values of 1, 0, and 0.5, respectively. We also
recorded response times for the self-report ratings. The sense of
agency and the sense of ownershipweremeasured on a continuous
scale of 0–100 after every 10 trials.
Reaction time to a target letter in the training and test phase
(Flanker task) was analyzed separately using two-sample t-tests.
The rating of sense of agency was analyzed using repeatedmeasure
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three factors: Tone congru-
ency with key press (two levels – congruent and incongruent
tone) × Validity of feedback (two levels – true and false feed-
back) × Flanker type (congruent and incongruent with target
letter). The sense of ownership rating and the reaction time for
the rating of sense of agency were analyzed in a similar repeated
measure ANOVA. The sense of agency rating, reaction time to
target letter, and sense of ownership were analyzed only for the
correct response trials (95.53% in Experiment 1 and 94.82% in
Experiment 2).
RESULTS
Between Experiments 1 and 2, only the latter had a debrieﬁng ses-
sion. InExperiment 2, twoparticipantswere removed from further
analysis because they reported more than 95% correct trials and
rated low belief (Mean = 2.5, on a scale of 0–10) on feedback.
The remaining 13 participants reported an average of 65.92%
(SD= 5.58) correct trials and they rated high belief (Mean= 7.92,
SD = 0.86) in feedback. Comparable estimates of correct trials
(65%) with the percentage of true feedback (60%) suggest that the
participants believed in feedback (χ2 = 1.04, p = 0.30).
SENSE OF AGENCY
Repeated measures ANOVA on the sense of agency rating (dis-
crete values) revealed main effect of tone congruency, whereas no
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signiﬁcant main effect of feedback and ﬂanker was found. How-
ever, more crucially we found signiﬁcant interaction between tone
congruency and validity of feedback. This suggests that effect of
congruency of tone on sense of self-agency was dependent on
feedback. There was no signiﬁcant interaction between ﬂanker
and feedback, and ﬂanker and tone congruency (See Table 2).
Further paired-sample t-test revealed that the sense of self-agency
was signiﬁcantly reduced for congruent tone and increased for
incongruent tone when feedback given was false (See Table 3;
Figure 2).
To explore any difference in the self-agency rating due to two
different rating scales, we performed bivariate correlation between
ratings from discrete (Yes, No, or Maybe) and continuous scales
(0–100). A signiﬁcant correlation between these two measures
was obtained [Experiment 1: r(60) = 0.89, p < 0.01, Experiment
2: r(52) = 0.90, p < 0.01 ] (See Figure 3).
RESPONSE TIME ON AGENCY RATING
The response time taken to rate the sense of self-agency was
analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA with three factors –
type of Flanker (2), type of feedback (2), and tone congruency
with key press (2). This analysis revealed signiﬁcant interaction
between feedback and tone, but no main effect of tone congru-
ency or feedback was found. Moreover, ﬂanker congruency with
target letter had no main effect on response time to attribute self-
agency (See Table 2). Further, pair-wise comparison showed that
response times for agency rating in congruent tone conditions
were signiﬁcantly higher [Experiment 1: t(14) = 3.14, p < 0.01;
Experiment 2: t(12) = 2.85, p < 0.01] in false feedback (Exper-
iment 1: 1.91 ± 0.58 s, Experiment 2: 1.80 ± 0.41 s) than in
true feedback conditions (Experiment 1: 1.42 ± 0.12 s, Experi-
ment 2: 1.57 ± 0.19 s). In incongruent tone conditions, response
times for rating sense of agency were signiﬁcantly lower [Exper-
iment 1: t(14) = 2.93, p < 0.05; Experiment 2: t(12) = 2.85,
p < 0.01] in false feedback (Experiment 1: 1.47 ± 0.11 s,
Experiment 2: 1.40 ± 0.14 s) as compared to true feedback condi-
tions (Experiment 1: 1.65 ± 0.12 s, Experiment 2: 1.72 ± 0.15 s).
The Participants took similar amounts of time [Experiment 1:
t(14) = 1.41, p = 0.17; Experiment 2: t(12) = 1.11, p = 0.28]
to attribute agency when they received false feedback and incon-
gruent outcome as compared to true feedback and congruent
outcome.
REACTION TIME TO TARGET LETTER
To check the manipulation effect of the Flanker task, we ana-
lyzed the reaction time to target letter for correct and incorrect
trials in both training and test phases, separately. In the train-
ing phase the participants were signiﬁcantly faster [Experiment 1:
Table 2 | Repeated measure ANOVA on self-agency rating, response time for agency rating, and ownership rating of Experiments 1 and 2.
Measures Source Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Self-agency rating Feedback F (1,14) = 0.68, p = 0.42 F (1,12) = 1.54, p = 0.23
Flanker congruency F (1,14) = 1.22, p = 0.28 F (1,12) = 1.22, p = 0.29
Tone congruency F (1,14) = 9.56, p < 0.01 F (1,12) = 5.75, p = 0.03
Tone congruency × feedback F (1,14) = 852.01, p < 0.01 F (1,12) = 758.64, p < 0.01
Flanker × feedback F (1,14) = 0.24, p = 0.63 F (1,12) = 0.72, p = 0.41
Flanker × tone congruency F (1,14) = 0.09, p = 0.76 F (1,14) = 0.008, p = 0.93
Agency rating time Feedback F (1,14) = 3.12, p = 0.09 F (1,12) = 3.72, p = 0.07
Flanker congruency F (1,14) = 0.07, p = 0.79 F (1,12) = 1.58, p = 0.49
Tone congruency F (1,14) = 2.12, p = 0.16 F (1,12) = 0.515, p = 0.48
Tone congruency × feedback F (1,14) = 11.04, p < 0.01 F (1,12) = 6.61, p = 0.02
Ownership rating Feedback F (1,14) = 0.02, p = 0.88 F (1,12) = 0.08, p = 0.78
Tone congruency F (1,14) = 0.54, p = 0.47 F (1,12) = 0.67, p = 0.42
Tone congruency × feedback F (1,14) = 1.51, p = 0.23 F (1,12) = 1.32, p = 0.28
Table 3 | Mean ± SD self-agency rating in different conditions of Experiment 1 and 2.
Type of tone False feedback True feedback Paired-sample t -test
Congruent tone Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 (excluded participants)
0.28 ± 0.08
0.23 ± 0.02
0.75
0.81 ± 0.04
0.89 ± 0.04
0.79
t (14) = 22.13, p < 0.01
t (12) = 25.14, p < 0.01
Incongruent tone Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 (excluded participants)
0.68 ± 0.10
0.70 ± 0.07
0.65
0.18 ± 0.15
0.19 ± 0.14
0.17
t (14) = 10.67, p < 0.01
t (12) = 12.80, p < 0.01
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FIGURE 2 | Sense of self-agency calculated from discrete scale (e.g.,Yes, No, or Maybe) in Experiment 1 (top panels) and Experiment 2 (bottom
panels). Standard deviations are plotted as error bars. (A) Average self-agency rating in true and false feedback conditions. (B) Average self-agency rating in
congruent and incongruent ﬂankers.
t(14) = 2.97, p = 0.01; Experiment 2: t(12) = 2.75, p < 0.01] in
incorrect responses (Experiment 1: 0.32 ± 0.15 s, Experiment 2:
0.35± 0.17 s) than correct responses (Experiment 1: 0.53± 0.18 s,
Experiment 2: 0.55± 0.15 s). The participants responded correctly
in 98.95 and 97.84% of total trials (300) in the training phase of
Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In the test phase, participants
were signiﬁcantly slower [Experiment 1: t(14) = 3.34, p < 0.01;
Experiment 2: t(12) = 5.82, p < 0.01] when they made incorrect
responses (Experiment 1: 1.3 ± 0.5 s, Experiment 2: 1.23 ± 0.28 s)
in comparison to correct responses (Experiment 1: 0.75 ± 0.06 s,
Experiment 2: 0.78 ± 0.04 s). The participants responded cor-
rectly in 95.53 and 94.82% of total trials (200) in the test phase
of experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The participants were signif-
icantly slower [Experiment 1: t(14) = 6.87, p < 0.01; Experiment
2: t(12) = 13.16, p< 0.01] in responding to the target letter when
its ﬂankers were incongruent (Experiment 1: 0.83 ± 0.07 s, Exper-
iment 2: 0.86 ± 0.06 s) as compared to congruent (Experiment 1:
0.67 ± 0.08 s, Experiment 2: 0.63 ± 0.03 s).
SENSE OF OWNERSHIP RATING
Rating for sense of ownershipwas analyzed through repeatedmea-
sure ANOVA with two within subject factors (tone congruency
with prediction, and feedback). There was nomain effect of either
tone congruency with prediction or feedback on sense of owner-
ship. No signiﬁcant effect of interaction between tone congruency
and feedback on sense of ownership was found (See Table 2).
DISCUSSION
The present study aims to investigate how sense of agency is
modulated by feedback about the validity of performed action.
Previous research has investigated how factors such as priming
the action, priming the outcome, or varying the characteris-
tics of the outcome affect the sense of agency. However, in this
study, we address how feedback about action validity affects
sense of agency. The results indicate that when true feedback
was given, an increased higher sense of agency was observed
for congruent as compared to incongruent outcome for the
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation between the self-agency ratings obtained from
continuous and discrete scale.
performed action. The novelty of this study lies in the ﬁnding
that participants felt a higher sense of agency for the incon-
gruent outcome when false feedback was given. This result
suggests that the participants readjusted the prediction of outcome
based on the feedback given, and attributed the sense of agency
accordingly.
In this study, the participants learned to predict a speciﬁc
outcome (a pair of tones) contingent on an action performed
(a preceding key press). Previous research has shown that
manipulating outcome (e.g., tone congruency with the pre-
diction) alters the sense of agency (Fourneret and Jeannerod,
1998; Sato and Yasuda, 2005). Our results conﬁrm the effect
of outcome manipulation with a signiﬁcant main effect for
tone congruency on the sense of agency. This is consistent
with the comparator model as the prediction generated by the
intended action (congruent tone) does not match with the out-
come (incongruent tone), i.e., when true feedback was given
(consistent with actual action performed), an increased sense of
agency was reported for congruent as compared to incongruent
tones.
Sato and Yasuda (2005) have found that sense of agency is
experienced for both intended and unintended actions (i.e., erro-
neous actions). In their study, Flanker stimuli introduce ambiguity
over action performed and created room for unintended actions
/errors. When an error is made, intended action and actual action
were different. Hence, predictions of sensory outcomes from
intended and actual actions are not the same. Sense of agency was
found to be higher when the outcome matched with prediction
based on actual action. In contrast, the sense of agency was low
when outcomematchedwith prediction based on intended action,
but did not match with actual action (Sato and Yasuda, 2005).
These results suggest that a readjustment of prediction of sen-
sory outcomehas occurred through errormonitoringmechanisms
(van Schie et al., 2004; Yordanova et al., 2004).
We used Flanker stimuli similar to Sato and Yasuda (2005)
with external feedback about validity of the action performed.
The feedback acts as an intermediate outcome before the ﬁnal
tone. If sense of agency depends on intended action independent
of feedback, then we should observe a high sense of agency for
outcomes (i.e., tone) that are congruent with prediction based
on intention (i.e., target letter). On the other hand, if feed-
back modulates sense of agency, then higher sense of agency
would be experienced for incongruent outcome with intended
actions when a false feedback is given. Our results support the
latter hypothesis that sense of agency had a strong interaction
between feedback and outcome congruency with intended action.
As expected, sense of agency was high for congruent and low for
incongruent outcomes when true feedback was given. In contrast,
participants attributed high self-agency for incongruent outcome
and low self-agency for congruent outcome, when false feed-
back was given. We speculate that in case of false feedback, the
altered agency attribution would reﬂect recalibration of sensory
predictions.
We assume that participants would believe that experimen-
tally given feedback was always true. We have replicated ﬁndings
from Experiment 1 with a subset of participants in Experiment
2 who believed in feedback. The estimated correct number of
trials matched close to actual number of true feedback trials
in Experiment 2. However, during the debrieﬁng session, two
of our participants expressed their doubts on the validity of
feedback. In the absence of any modulation of the sense of
agency by feedback, self-agency should be reported to be high
for congruent tones and low for incongruent tones irrespective
of feedback. However, for incongruent tones, these partici-
pants rated high self-agency with false feedback (Mean = 0.65)
in comparison to true feedback (Mean = 0.17; see Table 2).
This conﬁrms our ﬁndings partially, even when these partici-
pants explicitly mentioned low belief in the feedback given. Since
there are only two such reports, we have not discussed them in
detail.
There could be four possibilities for themodulation of the sense
of agency based on the feedback regarding validity of action. (1)
Participants could infer that perception of target letter was wrong,
(2) Participants could modulate inference of sense of self-agency
after the outcome, (3) Participants could readjust the notion of
executed motor program, i.e., they inferred that intended action
was not actual action, but believed that the other possible action
was performed, and (4) Participants could readjust the prediction
of sensory outcome from intended action to the outcome of other
possible action, irrespective of actual action.
The ﬁrst possibility is ruled out because we did not ﬁnd a main
effect of ﬂanker on sense of agency. We also argue against any
misidentiﬁcation of key to target map because this information
was explicitly displayed until the response was made. Further,
these mappings did not change across trials for a given partici-
pant.We also rule out the second possibility as low sense of agency
was reported for congruent tones with false feedback. If the recon-
struction happens after the outcome, participants should have
reported a higher sense of agency for congruent tones irrespective
of whether the feedback was true or false.
Our results support the third and the fourth possibilities and
show that there is a recalibration of sensory prediction based on
feedback. However, it is not possible to dissociate whether the
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recalibration is based on motor program level (i.e., possibility
3 above) or at the level of predicted outcome (i.e., possibility 4
above). According to this scheme, feedback can override predic-
tions by intended action. Hence, predictions by efference copy
of the comparator model would pertain to recalibrated motor
program, rather than intended actions alone. Our results sup-
port the previous ﬁndings of Sato and Yasuda (2005) regarding
error trials. In case of error, an internal feedback might be gener-
ated, which would in turn recalibrate the predictions of sensory
outcome. One further support for our argument comes from
the analysis of response times for attribution of sense of agency.
Results showed that participants take similar amounts of time
to attribute agency when they received false feedback and incon-
gruent outcome as compared to true feedback and congruent
outcome. This shows that participants were already expecting
the incongruent outcome based on false feedback. While sense
of agency was modulated with feedback, such an effect was not
apparent on the sense of ownership. Intact sense of ownership
in case of false feedback is similar to previous studies on predic-
tion and agency attribution (Sato and Yasuda, 2005). It provides
support to previous claims that sense of ownership is driven
by mere presence of sensory consequences and is not affected
by the characteristics of sensory prediction (Sato and Yasuda,
2005).
Future studies investigating the role of feedback in sense of
agency could focus on dissociating recalibration atmotor program
level vs. predicted outcome level. The feedback stimulus in this
study is assumed to be associated with the action performed as
part of the Flanker task. However, feedback precedes tone outcome
associatedwith keypress. Itwouldbenecessary to verify further the
exact role of the feedback cue on agency attribution. It also remains
to be investigatedwhether the sense of agencywould bemodulated
or not, if feedback cues were replaced by a prime for outcome.
Support for our argument for the role of feedback in recalibration
of prediction can be obtained by EEG studies focusing on error
related negativity. Alternatively, such a study could also clarify
whether the modulation in sense of agency is simply a post hoc
reconstruction based on observed outcome with no prediction
involved.
In summary, our hypothesis and results suggest that feedback
about the validity of action can recalibrate sensory predictions and
alter agency attribution. Hence, studies pertaining to sense of self-
agency should also include the effect of feedback (which could also
be internally driven) beyond the action – outcome contingency
driven attribution.
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